An Anti-Folk Theorem for Large Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring by Pai, Mallesh M. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
2.
28
01
v2
  [
cs
.G
T]
  8
 O
ct 
20
14
An Anti-Folk Theorem for Large Repeated Games
with Imperfect Monitoring∗
Mallesh M. Pai† Aaron Roth‡ Jonathan Ullman§
September 1, 2018
Abstract
We study infinitely repeated games in settings of imperfect monitoring. We first prove a
family of theorems that show that when the signals observed by the players satisfy a condition
known as (ǫ, γ)-differential privacy, that the folk theorem has little bite: for values of ǫ and
γ sufficiently small, for a fixed discount factor, any equilibrium of the repeated game involve
players playing approximate equilibria of the stage game in every period. Next, we argue that
in large games (n player games in which unilateral deviations by single players have only a small
impact on the utility of other players), many monitoring settings naturally lead to signals that
satisfy (ǫ, γ)-differential privacy, for ǫ and γ tending to zero as the number of players n grows
large. We conclude that in such settings, the set of equilibria of the repeated game collapse to
the set of equilibria of the stage game.
Our results nest and generalize previous results of Green (1980), Sabourian (1990) and
suggest that differential privacy is a natural measure of the “largeness” of a game. Further,
techniques from the literature on differential privacy allow us to prove quantitative bounds,
where the existing literature focuses on limiting results.
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1 Introduction
In a repeated game, agents interact with one another repeatedly, and can base their actions on their
memory of past interactions. One of the most robust features of models of infinitely repeated games
is the multiplicity of equilibria. Repeatedly playing Nash equilibria of the underlying stage game is
preserved as an equilibrium of the repeated game, but a much larger set is introduced as well. The
so called “folk theorems” state, informally, that any individually rational payoffs for each player
(i.e. payoffs that are above their minmax value in the game) can be achieved as an equilibrium of
the repeated game (if players are patient enough). The folk theorems can be interpreted as either
positive or negative statements. From the perspective of an optimist (or a mechanism designer),
they mean that high social-welfare behaviors (like cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma) can be
supported as equilibria in repeated games, even though they cannot be supported as equilibria of
the stage game. From the perspective of a pessimist (or a computer scientist), they mean that
the social welfare of the worst equilibrium can get worse (i.e. the price of anarchy increases).
Regardless of the stance one takes, because of the severe multiplicity problem, Nash equilibria of
repeated games lose much of their predictive power.
The simplest model of repeated games are repeated games with perfect monitoring. In these
games, after each period, each agent observes the exact action played by each of his opponents. In
several settings of interest, this assumption is unrealistic. A more natural model is repeated games
with imperfect monitoring, in which agents receive some kind of noisy signal about the play at the
last period. This signal could be an estimate of the payoff of each of a player’s actions, a noisy
histogram of how many players played each action, or information that is encoded as a set of prices.
The game could be one of private monitoring, in which each player receives his own signal privately,
or public monitoring, in which every player observes the same signal. Folk theorems are known to
hold in almost all models of repeated games, even those with imperfect public or private monitoring.
See Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) for a classic reference in the case of public monitoring,
Sugaya (2011) for a recent result in the case of private monitoring, and Mailath and Samuelson
(2006) for a textbook treatment.
In this paper, we show that these theorems will often lack bite in “large” games of imperfect
monitoring. Particularly, we consider games where the observed signals satisfy the notion of “dif-
ferential privacy” (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith, 2006), which we show arises naturally in
many games of imperfect monitoring with a large number of players. We show that in games with
differentially private signals, the set of equilibria of the repeated games must involve play of ap-
proximate equilibria of the stage game in every period—approximate Nash equilibrium in the case
of public monitoring and approximate correlated equilibrium in the case of private monitoring. Our
results therefore suggests that in games with a large number of players, we should not expect to see
“folk theorem equilibria.” This also adds to a long standing question in the literature on repeated
games—for a given fixed δ what payoffs can be achieved by equilibria of the repeated game?1 We
implicitly provide an upper bound on this set—it is the set of payoffs that can be achieved by the
play of approximate stage game equilibria in every period, with the degree of approximation being
bounded by our theorems.
A different way to view our results arises from a seeming discontinuity between dynamic models
with a continuum of players and those with a large but finite number of players.2 In a dynamic
model, incentives are generated by agents punishing or rewarding others for past play. When only
aggregate play is observed, then the play of one single agent does not affect the observed outcome
1See e.g. Mailath, Obara, and Sekiguchi (2002) for a characterization in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma with
perfect monitoring.
2We thank Nabil Al-Najjar and Preston McAfee for pointing out this connection to us.
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in the continuum case, and hence individual deviations cannot be detected. With a finite number
of players, a deviation may be small, but it is perfectly observable. Therefore deviations can be
punished or rewarded. A small literature attempts to bridge this discontinuity by postulating a
model of noisy observation. Our paper can be thought of as a “quantitative” version of their limit
results for repeated games. In particular, the noisiness of our signals are parametrized by two
numbers, ǫ and γ. We show that as ǫ + γ vanishes, we approximate the unobservability of the
continuum setting, while the perfect observability setting corresponds to ǫ+ γ large.
1.1 Related Work
It has long been understood (hence the term “folk theorem”) that the intertemporal incentives
generated by repeated interaction can support more outcomes than just the equilibria of the
one-off interaction. The literature is too large to survey here, we refer the interested reader
to the textbook by Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for a comprehensive and up-to-date treat-
ment. We review concepts that are standard in the literature as needed in Section 2. Repeated
games have also been studied in the computer science literature. An older literature studies re-
peated games when agents have limited computational resources—see e.g. Megiddo and Wigderson
(1986), Papadimitriou and Yannakakis (1994) or Abreu and Rubinstein (1988). There has also
been some recent interest in repeated games in the computer science community. These consider
games of perfect monitoring, and study the complexity of computing an equilibrium of the re-
peated game—see e.g. Borgs, Chayes, Immorlica, Kalai, Mirrokni, and Papadimitriou (2010) and
Halpern, Pass, and Seeman (2013).
The idea that noisy observation may limit the equilibria in repeated games has some
precedent in the literature—notably the papers of Green (1980), Sabourian (1990) and
Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2001).3 In relation to our setting, note that the first paper restricts
attention to trigger strategies, the first two papers assume the stage game is anonymous, and all
three consider public equilibria in a public monitoring setting. By contrast our results apply to
general games that satisfy the differential privacy condition, and apply also to private monitoring
settings. The results in those papers are limit theorems, while we prove quantitative bounds on the
relationship between the “amount” of noise and the degree of deviation from stage-Nash equilibria
that can be supported. Finally, while their conditions on the monitoring structure may be hard to
verify, we are able we use techniques from the literature on differential privacy (see below) to give
examples of “natural” settings satisfying our conditions.
“Differential Privacy” is a condition that a family of probability distributions (which are pa-
rameterized by n agent “reports”) may satisfy, which provides a multiplicative bound on the
influence that any single report can have on the resulting distribution. It was first defined by
Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith (2006) in the computer science literature, and has become
a standard “privacy” solution concept. We do not use the condition here to deal with privacy
concerns, but instead just as a useful Lipschitz condition that is commonly satisfied by many noisy
families of signal distributions. The connection between differential privacy and game theory was
first noted by McSherry and Talwar (2007) who observed that when this condition is applied to
an auction mechanism, it can be used to argue approximate truthfulness. They use it to derive
prior-free near revenue-optimal mechanisms for digital goods auctions. Since then, differential pri-
vacy has been used as a tool in a number of game theoretic settings, including mechanism design
without money (Nissim, Smorodinsky, and Tennenholtz, 2012) and mechanism design in prior-free
settings of incomplete information with mechanisms that have extremely weak powers of enforce-
ment (Kearns, Pai, Roth, and Ullman, 2014; Rogers and Roth, 2013). A related line of work seeks
3Levine and Pesendorfer (1995) study similar questions in dynamic games.
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to use traditional tools in mechanism design in settings in which agents have preferences for “pri-
vacy”, which are quantified by measures related to differential privacy (Ghosh and Roth, 2013;
Nissim, Orlandi, and Smorodinsky, 2012; Xiao, 2013; Chen, Chong, Kash, Moran, and Vadhan,
2013; Ghosh and Ligett, 2013; Nissim, Vadhan, and Xiao, 2014). See Pai and Roth (2013) for a
survey of this area and its connections to mechanism design and game theory.
2 Preliminaries
We consider infinitely repeated games that are played over a series of periods. Time is discrete and
is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
Stage Game There are n players who repeatedly play a stage game G. Each player i has a
finite set of actions Ai, and gets payoff ui :
∏n
j=1Aj → [0, 1]. We will denote an action profile
(i.e. a vector of actions, one for each player) by a ∈ ∏nj=1Aj. Mixed strategies are probability
distributions over pure strategies, which we write as ∆Ai for player i. We write αi ∈ ∆Ai to denote
a mixed strategy for player i, and α to denote a vector of mixed strategies. Payoffs for mixed
strategies are, as usual, the expected payoff when the profile of actions is drawn according to the
distribution specified by the mixed strategies.
All players discount the future at a rate δ ∈ [0, 1). Therefore an annuity that pays 1 in every
period, forever, has a present discounted value of 11−δ . As is standard in the literature on repeated
games, we normalize all payoffs by (1 − δ)—the value of the annuity of 1 forever is therefore
normalized to 1, while e.g. a payoff of 1 today and nothing thereafter is normalized to (1 − δ)
(because the agent would be indifferent between receiving 1 this period and nothing thereafter and
an annuity of (1− δ)).
Before we describe repeated games, we begin by reviewing two approximate equilibrium concepts
for the stage game.
Definition 1. An η-approximate Nash equilibrium of the stage game G is a vector α ∈∏nj=1∆Ai
of mixed strategies, such that for all i and all ai ∈ Ai:
ui(α) ≥ ui(ai, α−i)− η
Definition 2. An η-approximate correlated equilibrium of the stage game G is defined by a set of
signals S, a distribution D ∈ ∆Sn over n-tuples of signals, and a function σi : S → ∆Ai mapping
signals to mixed strategies for each player i. (D, σ) is an η-approximate correlated equilibrium if
for every signal s ∈ S and every action ai ∈ Ai:∑
s−i
[ui(ai, σ−i(s−i))− ui(σi(s), σ−i(s−i))]D(s−i|si = s) ≤ η
Monitoring We consider models of both public and private monitoring. In a game of public
monitoring, at the end of every period, after players have played their actions for that period, they
receive feedback about the actions taken by others via a public signal. Formally, at the end of the
period, when the profile of actions taken is a, all players commonly learn a signal s ∈ S, where s is
drawn independently by a distribution Pa ∈ ∆S.4
In a game of private monitoring, at the end of every period, after players have played their
actions for that period, each player i receives a private signal si ∈ S. Player i does not see the
4Note that this model subsumes the standard perfect monitoring model—if S ≡
∏
Ai and Pa(s) = 1 iff s = a.
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signals sj for j 6= i. Formally, at the end of a period in which the profile of actions taken is a,
a vector of signals s ∈ Sn is drawn from a distribution Pa ∈ ∆Sn, and each player i observes
component si of s. Note that the signals that different players receive can be correlated. Further,
note that this generalizes the public monitoring setting—public monitoring is simply the case where
every player’s signal is identical.
The ex-post payoff of each player i is given by a function Ui : Ai × S → R so that the signal a
player receives is a sufficient statistic for the payoff he receives. We assume that
ui(ai, a−i) =
∑
s∈S
Ui(ai, s)Pa(s), (1)
so that the noisy payoff does not affect the incentive structure of the game.
We consider a commonly satisfied condition on the distribution of signals that players observe—
informally, that they are noisy in a way that does not reveal “much” about the action of any single
player.
Definition 3. A public monitoring signal structure is said to satisfy (ǫ, γ)-differential privacy for
some ǫ, γ > 0 if for every player i and for every a = (a1, a2, . . . , an), a
′ = (a′i, a−i), and any event
E ⊆ S,
exp(−ǫ)P
a
′(E)− γ ≤ Pa(E) ≤ exp(ǫ)Pa′(E) + γ.
A private monitoring signal structure satisfies (ǫ, γ)-differential privacy if for every player i and
for every a = (a1, a2, . . . , an), a
′ = (a′i, a−i), and for every event E ⊆ Sn,
exp(−ǫ)Pa′(E)− γ ≤ Pa(E) ≤ exp(ǫ)Pa′(E) + γ.
Remark 1. Differential privacy is a condition applied to study the privacy of randomized algorithms
on a “database”(i.e. not generally applied to the signal structure of a repeated games), and was first
defined by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith, 2006).
Remark 2. Due to (1), the assumption that a signalling structure satisfies (ǫ, γ)-differential privacy
is nontrivial. Fixing values of ǫ, γ, there exist stage games for which no such (ǫ, γ)-differentially
private signal structure can satisfy (1)). That said, several stage games of interest can be paired
with differentially private signal structures. Broadly, this includes any large game, i.e. one in which
any player, by unilaterally changing the action he plays, has a small impact on the stage-game utility
of any other player. We present several examples in Section 4.
Remark 3. The papers of Green (1980) and Sabourian (1990) use the total variation norm, which
corresponds to (0, γ)-differential privacy.
For technical reasons, the following definition is often assumed (see e.g. Mailath and Samuelson
(2006)). We say the that the monitoring structure is one of no observable deviations, i.e. that the
marginal distribution of private signals have full support regardless of the action profile played.
Formally:
Definition 4. A repeated game of public monitoring is said to have no observable deviations if
∀ a ∈
∏
Ai, s ∈ S : Pa(s) > 0.
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A repeated game of private monitoring is said to have no observable deviations if
∀ a ∈
∏
Ai, si ∈ S : Pa(si) > 0.
Intuitively, in the repeated game agents will be trying to infer what other players played from
this signal—this assumption ensures that Bayesian updating is well defined after any observed
signal.
Histories and Strategies In the public monitoring setting the public information in period t
is the history of public signals, ht = (s1, s2, . . . , st−1). The set of public histories is
H ≡ ∪∞t=2St−1.
A history for a player includes both the public history and the history of actions he has taken,
hti = (s
1, a1i , s
2, a2i , . . . s
t−1, at−1i ). Given a a private history h
t
i = (s
1, a1i , s
2, a2i , . . . s
t−1, at−1i ), one
can define the public history ht = (s1, s2, . . . st−1) as just the vector of public signals observed. The
set of private histories for player i is
Hi ≡ ∪∞t=2(Ai × S)t−1.
We refer to the vector of private histories (one for each player), at period t by ht ≡ (ht1, ht2, . . . , htn).
In the private monitoring setting, the history for a player i is the history of the actions he has
taken, together with his sequence of private signals: hti = (s
1
i , a
1
i , s
2
i , a
2
i , . . . s
t−1
i , a
t−1
i ).
A pure strategy for player i is a mapping from the set of histories of player i to the set of actions
of player i:
σi : Hi → Ai,
and a mixed strategy is a mapping from histories to distributions over actions. We denote σi(h
t
i)(ai)
as the probability strategy σi puts on action ai after private hisotry h
t
i.
Strategies in a repeated game can in general depend on a player’s entire history, but in a game
of public monitoring, we can also consider public strategies which depend only on the public signals
observed so far (and not on the unobserved actions played by the player).
Definition 5. A strategy σi is public if it only depends on the public history H , i.e. for any period
t and two private histories hti, h
′t
i with the same public history h
t,
σi(h
t
i) = σi(h
′t
i ).
Solution Concepts Equilibria are defined with respect to the cumulative discounted payoff
that players obtain when the play according to a profile of strategies σ. Formally, we need to
recursively define the expected payoff of strategy profile σ to player i after private history hti. Let
us begin with the case of public monitoring.
Fix a strategy profile σ. Then, for every player i and every history hti, we can define a posterior
distribution D(i, hti, σ−i) on histories ht−i observed by the other players. In other words the proba-
bility that the other players observed private histories ht−i given player i’s private history is h
t
i and
they play strategies σ−i is given as D(i, hti, σ−i)(ht−i).
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Further, given strategies σ, define Wi,σ(h
t) as:
Wi,σ(h
t) =(1− δ)ui(σi(hti), σ−i(ht−i))
+ δ
∑
s,ai,a−i
Wi,σ((h
t, s, (ai, a−i)))σi(hti)(ai)σ−i(h
t
−i)(a−i)P(ai,a−i)(s)
Note that the argument to Wi is the vector of private histories of all agents h
t. It represents the
expected discounted value to agent i continuing from a point where his private history is hti and
the private histories of other players are ht−i. Of course player i only knows his own private history,
therefore player i’s continuation value after a private history hti is
Vi,σ(h
t
i) =
∑
ht−i
Wi,σ((h
t
i, h
t
−i))D(i, hti, σ−i)(ht−i)
=(1− δ)
∑
ht−i
ui(σi(h
t
i), σ−i(h
t
−i))D(i, hti, σ−i)(ht−i)
+ δ
∑
ht−i,s,ai,a−i
(
Wi,σ(((h
t
i, h
t
−i, s, (ai, a−i)))D(i, hti , σ−i)(ht−i)
σi(h
t
i)(ai)σ−i(h
t
−i)(a−i)P(ai,a−i)(s)
)
For the case that σ is in public strategies, for any public history ht, we can simplify the
continuation value as:
Vi,σ(h
t) = (1− δ)ui(σ(ht)) + δ
∑
s
Vi(σ(h
t, s))Pσ(ht)(s).
For the case of private monitoring, the definition is slightly different, since every player sees a
separate private signal. Define Wi,σ(h
t) as:
Wi,σ(h
t) =(1− δ)ui(σi(hti), σ−i(ht−i))
+ δ
∑
si,s−i,ai,a−i
Wi,σ((h
t, (si, s−i), (ai, a−i)))σi(hti)(ai)σ−i(h
t
−i)(a−i)P(ai,a−i)[si, s−i]
Player i’s continuation value after a private history hti is
Vi,σ(h
t
i) =
∑
ht−i
Wi,σ((h
t
i, h
t
−i))D(i, hti, σ−i)(ht−i)
=(1− δ)
∑
ht−i
ui(σi(h
t
i), σ−i(h
t
−i))D(i, hti, σ−i)(ht−i)
+ δ
∑
ht−i,si,s−i,ai,a−i
(
Wi,σ(((h
t
i, h
t
−i, (si, s−i), (ai, a−i)))D(i, hti , σ−i)(ht−i)
σi(h
t
i)(ai)σ−i(h
t
−i)(a−i)P(ai,a−i)[si, s−i]
)
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Definition 6 (Nash Equilibrium). A set of strategies σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a Nash equilibrium of a
repeated game if for every player i and every strategy σ′i:
Vi,σ(∅) ≥ Vi,(σ−i,σ′i)(∅)
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium requires that from any history, the continuation play forms
a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 7 (Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium). In a game of perfect monitoring, a set of
strategies σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of a repeated game if for every
player i, every finite history ht and every strategy σ′i:
Vi,σ(h
t) ≥ Vi,(σ−i,σ′i)(h
t)
In the case of imperfect monitoring, histories are not common knowledge (agents privately
observe the actions they take), there is no well-defined “subgame.” There is, however, one in the
case where all players use public strategies. Formally, in games of public monitoring, we can define
a “perfect public equilibrium.” This is a particularly structurally simple equilibrium concept in
repeated games, but one in which a folk theorem is known to hold. Although our results hold more
generally, we will first prove our “anti-folk-theorem” for perfect public equilibrium.
Definition 8. A perfect public equilibrium (PPE) is a profile of public strategies for each player
(Definition 5) such that the continuation play from every public history constitutes a Nash Equilib-
rium.
Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) show that as long as the signalling structure is rich
enough (satisfying a full rank condition), a Folk theorem holds in perfect public equilibria.
Finally, to consider general (not necessarily public) strategies in games of public monitoring, and
games of private monitoring, there are no counterparts to subgame perfect/ perfect public equilibria.
Consequently, the refinement that is normally considered is that of sequential equilibrium, which
requires that for any player i and any private history hti, the continuation play is a best reply to
the play of others given the agent’s beliefs about the private histories they observe. Formally:
Definition 9. Suppose game is one of no observable deviations (Definition 4). A strategy profile
σ is a sequential equilibrium if for all private histories hti, σi(h
t
i) is a best reply to σ−i(h
t
−i)|hti.
As we alluded to earlier, the assumption of no observable deviations is made to ensure that the
conditional distribution σ−i(ht−i)|hti is well defined at every private history.
3 Signal Privacy Yields Anti-Folk Theorems
3.1 Public Monitoring
3.1.1 Perfect Public Equilibria
As we said earlier, the main ideas in our construction are easiest to explain for the case of public
perfect equilibria (Definition 8). The intuition is essentially encapsulated as follows: in general,
the only thing that prevents an agent at some stage t from deviating from his equilibrium strategy,
and playing a (stage-game) best response to the distribution over his opponent’s actions is fear
of punishment: if his opponents can detect this deviation, then they can change their behavior
to lower his expected future payoff. Differential privacy provides us a simple, worst-case way of
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quantifying the decrease in expected future payoff that can result from a single player’s one-stage
unilateral deviation. If this decrease can be made small enough, then it cannot serve as an incentive
to prevent any player from playing anything other than an (approximate) stage-game best response
to his opponents. Thus, every day, all players must be playing an approximate equilibrium of the
stage game. We formalize this intuition in the next theorem:
Theorem 1. Fix any repeated game with discount factor δ, with public signals that satisfy (ǫ, γ)-
signal privacy. Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) be a perfect public equilibrium (Definition 8). Then for every
history ht, the distribution on actions that result, (σ1(h
t), . . . , σn(h
t)), forms an η-approximate
Nash equilibrium of the stage game, for
η =
δ
1− δ (ǫ+ γ).
Proof. Since σ forms a perfect public equilibrium of the repeated game, for every public history
ht we have:
Vi,σ(h
t) ≥ Vi,(σ−i,σ′i)(ht)
Expanding this definition, and noting that in particular single stage deviations cannot be profitable,
we know for every single-stage deviation a′i:
(1− δ)ui(σ(ht)) + δ
∑
s∈S
Vi,σ((h
t, s))Pσ(ht)(s)
≥(1− δ)ui(a′i, σ−i(ht)) + δ
∑
s∈S
Vi,σ((h
t, s))P(a′
i
,σ−i(ht))(s).
By the definition of (ǫ, γ)-signal privacy, we also know that for all s,
Pσ(ht)(s) ≥ exp(−ǫ)P(a′
i
,σ−i(ht))(s)− γ
Since Vi,· is the normalized infinite discounted sum of numbers between 0 and 1, Vi,·(·) ∈ [0, 1]. We
can therefore derive:
(1− δ)ui(σ(ht))
≥(1− δ)ui(a′i, σ−i(ht)) + δ
∑
s∈S
Vi,σ((h
t, s))
(
P(a′
i
,σ−i(ht))(s)− Pσ(ht)(s)
)
≥(1− δ)ui(a′i, σ−i(ht)) + δ
∑
s∈S
Vi,σ((h
t, s))
(
exp(−ǫ)P(a′
i
,σ−i(ht))(s)−∆s − Pσ(ht)(s)
)
where ∆s is the smallest non-negative value that satisfies the inequality
Pσ(ht)(s) ≥ exp(−ǫ)P(a′
i
,σ−i(ht))(s)−∆s.
Note that for signals s such that Pσ(ht)(s) ≤ exp(−ǫ)P(a′
i
,σ−i(ht))(s), ∆s = 0. Let S+ = {s ∈ S :
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∆s > 0}. We continue, noting that exp(−ǫ) > 1− ǫ for ǫ < 1:
(1− δ)ui(σ(ht))
≥(1− δ)ui(a′i, σ−i(ht)) + δ
∑
s∈S
Vi,σ((h
t, s))
(−ǫPσ(ht)(s)−∆s)
≥(1− δ)ui(a′i, σ−i(ht))− δ

ǫ+ ∑
s∈S+
Vi,σ((h
t, s))∆s


≥(1− δ)ui(a′i, σ−i(ht))− δ(ǫ+ γ).
The last inequality follows because
∑
s∈S+ ∆s is the smallest value ∆ that satisfies the inequality
Pσi(ht)(S+) ≥ exp(−ǫ)P(a′i,σ−i(ht))(S+)−∆, but by our guarantee of (ǫ, γ) signal privacy, we know
that we must have ∆ ≤ γ, and so ∑s∈S+ ∆s ≤ γ. Dividing both sides by 1− δ we get:
ui(σ(h
t)) ≥ ui(a′i, σ−i(ht))−
δ
1− δ (ǫ+ γ)
In other words, at any history ht, the prescribed strategy profile σ(ht) must form a δ1−δ (ǫ+ γ)-
approximate Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
With a bit more care, we can prove a related theorem that extends to the case of non-public
strategies. The proof is similar, but with two caveats:
First, we must now consider a deviation of player i, σ′i that not only makes a single stage game
deviation to a′i at some day t, but then continues to play using an artificial history that for every
day t′ > t, records that on day t, player i played an action drawn from σi(hti) instead of having
played a′i.
Second, the strategies that form the stage-game equilibrium are not exactly σi(h
t
i), for with
these strategies, each player might be best-responding not to the strategies of his opponent, but
to the expected strategies of his opponents (defined by their unknown histories htj , which take
into account not just the publicly observed signals, but also the privately known action history),
conditioned on the public part of the history.
Instead, the strategies that form the stage-game equilibrium are the randomized strategies
σi(h
t
i|s), where the randomness is taken over the realization of the players (privately known) action
history, conditioned on the (publicly observed) signal history. We begin with some notation: Given
a set of t−1 public signals st = (s1, . . . , st−1) and a vector of actions for player i, ati = (a1i , . . . , at−1i ),
write hti(s
t,ati) = (a
1
i , s1, . . . , a
t−1
i , st−1) to denote the history that combines them. Given a strategy
σi for player i mapping histories to actions, together with a vector of public signals s
t write: σˆi|st
to denote the probability distribution that plays each action ai with probability equal to:
Pr[ai ∼ σˆi|st] =
∑
a
t
i
∈At−1
i
Pr[ati|st] · σi(hti(st,ati))
In other words, σˆi|st represents the distribution defined over actions played by player i, σi(hti) when
all that is known is the public history, and the randomness is both over the choice of actions ati
that define hti, as well as the randomness in the mixed strategies σi(h
t
i).
We can now state our theorem:
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Theorem 2. Fix any repeated game with discount factor δ, with public signals that satisfy (ǫ, γ)-
signal privacy and no observable deviation (Definition 4). Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) be a sequential
equilibrium of the repeated game (Definition 9). Then for every public history of signals st, the
distribution on actions played on day t, (σˆ1|st , . . . , σˆn|st), forms an η-approximate Nash equilibrium
of the stage game, for
η =
δ
1− δ (ǫ+ γ).
The proof is deferred to the appendix.
3.1.2 Non-subgame perfect equilibria
We can prove a similar theorem even for non-subgame perfect equilibrium – except that now our
claim only applies to histories that occur with nonzero probability when players play according to
the specified equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Fix any repeated game with discount factor δ, with public signals that satisfy (ǫ, γ)-
differential privacy. Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) denote a public equilibrium (not necessarily subgame
perfect). Then for every history ht that occurs with positive probability when players play according
to σ, the distribution on actions at stage t, (σ1(h
t), . . . , σn(h
t)) forms an η-approximate Nash
equilibrium of the stage game, for
η =
δ
1− δ (ǫ+ γ)
Proof. We will write Prσ[h
t] to denote the probability that a given public history ht arises when
players use strategies σ. For each j ≤ t, write ht,≤j to denote the sub-history of ht consisting of
the first j periods, and ht,j to be the jth period history. Then:
Pr
σ
[ht] =
t∏
j=1
Pσ(ht,≤j)(h
t,j)
Now fix any T. We can write:
Vi,σ(∅) = (1− δ)

 ∑
hT∈ST
Pr
σ
[hT ]
((
T∑
t=0
δtui(σ(h
T,≤t)) +
δT+1
1− δ
∑
s∈S
Vi,σ(h
T , s)Pσ(ht)(s)
))
Consider any history hT such that Prσ[h
T ] > 0, and consider the deviation of player i, σ′i that is
identical to σi, except that on history h
T player i plays a stage-game best response to his opponents.
σ′i(h
T ) = argmaxa∈Ai ui(a, σ−i(h
T )) ≡ a∗i . Since σ is a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game, we
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know that Vi,σ(∅)−Vi,(σ′
i
,σ−i)(∅) ≥ 0. Since Prσ[hT ] > 0, we can divide and write this difference as:
0 ≤ 1
(1− δ) Prσ[hT ]
(
Vi,σ(∅)− Vi,(σ′
i
,σ−i)(∅)
)
=
(
δT
(
ui(σ(h
T ))− ui(a∗i , σ−i(hT ))
)
+
δT+1
1− δ
∑
s∈S
Vi,σ(h
T , s)
(
Pσ(ht)(s)− P(a∗
i
,σ(hT ))(s)
))
≤
(
δT
(
ui(σ(h
T ))− ui(a∗i , σ−i(hT ))
)
+
δT+1
1− δ
∑
s∈S
(
Pσ(ht)(s)− P(a∗
i
,σ(hT ))(s))
))
≤
(
δT
(
ui(σ(h
T ))− ui(a∗i , σ−i(hT ))
)
+
δT+1
1− δ (ǫ+ γ)
)
where the last inequality follows from (ǫ, γ)-differential privacy, and the fact that exp(−ǫ) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Dividing through by δT and rearranging, we find:
(
ui(a
∗
i , σ−i(h
T ))− ui(σ(hT ))
) ≤ δ
1− δ (ǫ+ γ)
which completes the proof.
3.2 Private Monitoring
Next, we consider the case of private monitoring. Our theorem here is slightly weaker: that when
playing a game with differentially private signals, every equilibrium of the repeated game must at
each stage play an approximate correlated equilibrium of the stage game. The reason is natural:
agents are no longer aware of the history that their opponents are viewing, and so can no longer
consider deviations that are best responses to the distributions being played on that day by their
opponents. However, they may at any stage consider deviations that base their action on the past
private signals that they observe, which gives a posterior distribution on the signals that their
opponents observe. Since the distribution on signals that players receive can be correlated; the
appropriate stage game solution concept is correlated equilibrium.
Theorem 4. Fix any repeated game with discount factor δ and private signals that satisfy (ǫ, γ)-
differential privacy and no observable deviations (Definition 4). Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) denote
a sequential equilibrium of the repeated game (Definition 9). Then for every history ht ≡
(ht1, h
t
2, . . . , h
t
n) that occurs with positive probability when players play according to σ, the dis-
tribution on actions at stage (σ1(h
t
1), . . . , σn(h
t
n)) forms an η-approximate correlated equilibrium
for
η =
δ
1− δ (ǫ+ γ).
Proof. Fix a sequential equilibrium σ. Then, for every player i and every history hti, we can define
a posterior distribution D(i, hti, σ−i) on histories ht−i observed by the other players. In other words
the probability that the other players observed private histories ht−i given player i’s private history
is hti and they play strategies σ−i is given as D(i, hti, σ−i)(ht−i).
Fix a player i and a period t. Consider a private history hti that can arise with positive
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probability when all players play according to σ from periods 1 to t− 1. Define
a∗i ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
∑
ht−i
ui(ai, σ−i(ht−i))D(i, hti , σ−i)(ht−i).
In words a⋆i is the period t best response for player i who observes private history h
t
i.
Define σ′i to be the strategy that is identical to σi, except on history h
t
i, it plays σ
′
i(h
t
i) = a
∗
i ,
and then play in future periods is according to σi as if an action drawn from σi(h
t
i) was played in
period t. Formally, for any period τ > t, with realized history hτi , the deviation involves playing
σi(h
′τ
i ), where h
′τ
i is the same as h
τ
i except in the component corresponding to the action played at
time t; i.e. a′ti ∼ σi(hit) whereas ati = a∗ by definition.
Further, given strategies σ, and any history ht = (ht1, . . . , h
t
n) for the n players, define Wi,σ(h
t)
as:
Wi,σ(h
t) =(1− δ)ui(σi(hti), σ−i(ht−i))
+ δ
∑
si,s−i,ai,a−i
Wi,σ((h
t, (si, s−i), (ai, a−i)))σi(hti)(ai)σ−i(h
t
−i)(a−i)P(ai,a−i)[si, s−i]
Note that the argument to Wi is the vector of private histories of all agents, h
t. It represents the
expected discounted value to agent i continuing from a point where his private history is hti and
the private histories of other players are ht−i. Of course player i only knows his own private history,
therefore player i’s continuation value playing σi after a private history h
t
i is
Vi,σ(h
t
i) =
∑
ht−i
Wi,σ((h
t
i, h
t
−i))D(i, hti , σ−i)(ht−i),
=⇒ Vi,σ(hti) =(1− δ)
∑
ht−i
ui(σi(h
t
i), σ−i(h
t
−i))D(i, hti , σ−i)(ht−i)
+ δ
∑
ht−i,si,s−i,ai,a−i
(
Wi,σ(((h
t
i, h
t
−i), (si, s−i), (ai, a−i)))D(i, hti , σ−i)(ht−i)
σi(h
t
i)(ai)σ−i(h
t
−i)(a−i)P(ai,a−i)[si, s−i]
)
.
Now consider σ′i to be the deviation we described above. Note that by playing σ
′
i from history h
t
i
onwards, player i’s expected discounted payoff can be written as:
Vi,(σ−i,σ′i)(h
t
i) =(1− δ)
∑
ht−i
ui(a
∗
i , σ−i(h
t
−i))D(i, hti , σ−i)(ht−i)
+ δ
∑
ht−i,si,s−i,ai,a−i
(
Wi,σ(((h
t
i, h
t
−i), (si, s−i), (ai, a−i)))D(i, hti , σ−i)(ht−i)
σi(h
t
i)(ai)σ−i(h
t
−i)(a−i)P(a∗i ,a−i)[si, s−i]
)
Since σ forms a sequential equilibrium of the repeated game, for every history hti that occurs with
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positive probability, we have:
Vi,σ(h
t
i) ≥ Vi,(σ−i,σ′i)(h
t
i).
Substituting the definitions of Vi,σ(h
t
i) and Vi,(σ−i,σ′i)(h
t
i) into this inequality, we have:∑
ht−i
(
ui(a
∗, σ−i(ht−i))− ui(σi(hti), σ−i(ht−i))
)D(i, hti, σ−i)(ht−i)
≤ δ
1− δ
∑
ht−i,si,s−i,ai,a−i
(
Wi,σ(((h
t
i, h
t
−i), (si, s−i), (ai, a−i)))D(i, hti , σ−i)(ht−i)
σi(h
t
i)(ai)σ−i(h
t
−i)(a−i)
(
Pai,a−i [si, s−i]− P(a∗i ,a−i)[si, s−i]
))
By (ǫ, γ)-differential privacy of the private signal Pa(s), and the fact that exp(−ǫ) ≥ 1−ǫ, therefore,
we have ∑
ht−i
(
ui(a
∗
i , σ−i(h
t
−i))− ui(σi(hti), σ−i(ht−i))
)D(i, hti, σ−i)(ht−i) ≤ δ1− δ (ǫ+ γ).
By Definition 2, therefore, the strategies σi involve the play of
δ
1−δ (ǫ + γ)-approximate correlated
equilibrium in every period: the analogue of the private signal observed by players in that definition
is the private history hti, which are correlated via the strategies σi and monitoring structure.
4 Examples of Games with Signal Privacy
The rest of this paper will be devoted to showing by example that such differentially private signal
structures may naturally arise in large games. In particular, we will show that if the number of
players n is large, ǫ and γ may naturally be small. This suggests that in large societies, inter-
temporal transfers may not support “much more” than repeated play of the static equilibria of the
stage game.
Gaussian (i.e. normally distributed) mean-zero noise is a natural form of perturbation that
arises in many settings of impartial information (it is the limiting distribution of many independent
random processes). It also happens to be a noise distribution that guarantees differential privacy.
Formally, a theorem from Dwork, Kenthapadi, McSherry, Mironov, and Naor (2006) will be useful.5
First we define the (L2) sensitivity of a function.
Definition 10. A function f : T n → Rd has L2 sensitivity s if for any t ∈ T n, i ≤ n and t′ ∈ T ,
we have that
‖f(t)− f(t′, t−i)‖2 ≤ s,
where ‖·‖2 is the standard Euclidean norm in Rd.
Theorem 5 (Dwork, Kenthapadi, McSherry, Mironov, and Naor (2006)). Suppose a function f :
T n → Rd has L2 sensitivity s. Then the algorithm that computes f(t) + Z is (ǫ, γ)-differentially
private, where Z ∈ Rd is a random vector where each coordinate is drawn i.i.d. from the normal
5A proof of this theorem in the form stated here can be found in Appendix A of Hardt and Roth (2012).
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distribution N(0, σ2) for
σ =
s
ǫ
√
log
(
1.25
γ
)
.
The following corollary will be useful in our analysis.
Corollary 1. Suppose a function f : T n → Rd has L2 sensitivity s(n) (here we assume the
sensitivity is a function of n, which should be thought of as diminishing in n). Then for any
constant σ, the algorithm that computes f(t) + Z where Z ∈ Rd is a random vector where each is
drawn i.i.d. from the normal distribution N(0, σ2) is (ǫ, γ)-differentially private for
ǫ+ γ ∈ O
(
s(n)
√
log 1
s(n)
)
In particular if the sensitivity s(n) ∈ O( 1
n
), we have ǫ+ γ ∈ O(
√
logn
n
)
4.1 Large Anonymous Games
A class of games that has received much attention in the literature is the class of Large Anonymous
games. In these games, all players have the same set of available actions and each player’s payoff
depends only on the action he takes and the histogram of actions taken by others (and not on the
identity of the players).6
Consider a repeated game that has such a large anonymous game as a stage game. A player’s
payoff from playing action a ∈ A, when the population distribution of plays by others is α ∈ ∆A
is ui(a, α) ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose further that in every period, a noisy histogram of the actions taken
by all agents is announced, i.e. when the realized distribution of plays is α ∈ ∆A, the announced
distribution is α + Z for Z ∈ R|A|, with each component of Z ∼ N(0, σ2). Then, fixing players’
discount factor δ, by Corollary 1 and Theorem 1 that any perfect public equilibrium of the repeated
game must involve each player playing an η−approximate Nash equilibrium of the stage game for
η ∈ O
(
δ
1− δ
√
log n
n
)
.
Note that as n tends large, η → 0.
Note that a similar noise distribution results if α ∈ ∆A is computed by subsampling player
actions. It can similarly be shown that the distribution that results from subsampling (sufficiently
to get a constant error rate in the action histogram) results in an (ǫ, γ) differential privacy guarantee
with (ǫ+ γ) tending to 0 as n grows large.
4.2 Noisy Cournot Games
One of the classic empirical applications of repeated games is to study the possibility of collusion
in repeated oligopolistic competition—see Green and Porter (1984) for a classic reference. We
demonstrate via their model that in a large oligopoly, collusion may be impossible.
The stage game is n-firm Cournot competition. Each firm i simultaneously chooses quantity
qi ∈ [0, 1] to produce, at a cost of c(qi). For simplicity in calculations, take c(qi) = qi. After all
6Papers in this literature often refer to such games simply as Large games.
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firms have selected quantities, a price is determined from the (realized, stochastic) demand as
p = θP
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
qi
)
,
where P (·) is a continuously differentiable decreasing demand function and θ is the realized demand
shock. We assume that θ is distributed log-normally with E[θ] = 1. Each firm i then realizes a
profit of its revenue less cost, i.e., pqi − c(qi). Further, only this price p is observed publicly by all
the firms—firms do not directly observe the quantities produced by other firms. Taking logarithms,
we have that
log p = log θ + log P
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
qi
)
.
For n large, by a Taylor series expansion, we have that the sensitivity of log P (·) is
1
n
sup
x∈[0,1]
P ′(x)
P (x)
.
Note that fixing a function P , this quantity is diminishing at a rate of O(1/n). Note also that since
θ is log-normally distributed, log θ is normally distributed. Therefore by Corollary 1 and Theorem
1, any Perfect Public equilibrium of the stage game must involve the play of approximate Nash
Equilibrium of the stage game in every period for η ∈ O
(
δ
1−δ
√
logn
n
)
.
4.3 Noisy Counterfactual Payoffs
Now let us consider an example of an imperfect private monitoring setting. Fix a n player game,
and assume that the game is µ–sensitive, i.e. for every player i and every player j 6= i, j changing
the action he plays can affect player i’s payoff by at most µ regardless of what everyone else is
playing:
∀i 6= j, ai, aj , a′j , a−ij : |ui(ai, aj , a−ij)− ui(ai, a′j , a−ij)| ≤ µ.
After each period, each player receives a private signal of a (noisy) estimate of the payoff she would
have received in the past period for each of the actions she could have taken, i.e. Si = R
|Ai|,
and when other players play a−i, player i receives a signal where the component corresponding to
action a is ui(a, a−i) +N(0, σ2). Such a signal structure has been widely studied in both the game
theory and machine learning literatures. In the game theory literature, Hart and Mas-Colell (2000)
and Foster and Vohra (1997) show that simple heuristic strategies (minimizing regret) played in
this setting will result in the empirical distribution of play converging to the set of correlated
equilibria, see e.g. Chapter 4 of Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, and Vazirani (2007) for a survey and
the connections to machine learning.
We note that in a k-action game, the resulting signal distribution is over a vector of length
k · n (reporting the payoff to each of the n players for each of their k actions). Since each action is
individually µ sensitive, the ℓ2 sensitivity of the entire vector of payoffs is O(
√
nkµ). Fixing players’
discount factor δ, by Corollary 1 and Theorem 1 it follows that any perfect public equilibrium of
the repeated game must involve each player playing an η−approximate Correlated equilibrium of
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the stage game for
η ∈ O
(
δ
1− δµ
√
n · k log 1
µ
)
.
Note that as n tends large, if µ≪ 1√
n
, η → 0.
4.4 Other Settings with Private Signaling
Finally, we remark that the three settings we have noted in which the signals are naturally differ-
entially private (noisy anonymous games, noisy Cournot games, and noisy counterfactual payoffs)
are not isolated examples. Differential privacy is a powerful measure of “influence” in part because
it enjoys a strong “composition” property. A sequence of (ǫ, γ)-differentially private distrubu-
tions (even chosen adaptively, as a function of the realized values of previous distributions) remain
(ǫ′, γ′)-differentially private, for values of ǫ′ and γ′ depending on the number of compositions and
the parameters ǫ and γ. Informally, the γ’s “add up” linearly, whereas the ǫ parameters increase
only with the square root of the number of such compositions.7 Formally, we have the following
theorem due to Dwork, Rothblum, and Vadhan (2010):
Theorem 6 (Composition for differential privacy, Dwork, Rothblum, and Vadhan (2010)). Let
M1(D), . . . ,Mk(D) be families of distributions such that each Mi is (ǫi, γi)-differentially private
with ǫi ≤ ǫ′. Then for any γ ∈ [0, 1]: M(D) = (M1(D), . . . ,Mk(D)) is (ǫ, γ +
∑k
i=1 γi)-private for
ǫ =
√
2 log(1/γ)kǫ′ + kǫ′(eǫ
′ − 1)
M(D) also satisfies (ǫ, γ) differential privacy for ǫ =
∑k
i=1 ǫi and γ =
∑k
i=1 γi.
8 Moreover, these
compositional properties hold even if each distribution Mi is chosen adaptively, i.e. only after
observing the realized values of distributions M1(D), . . . ,Mi−1(D).
Most immediately, this means that our results hold for any combination of the signalling
schemes discussed so far: for example, agents could observe both a noisy price, and a noisy
histogram of actions that were played, and the resulting composite signal would remain differ-
entially private. More generally, a large number of simple noisy “primitives” guarantee differential
privacy: we have already seen that the natural operation of adding Gaussian noise to a low sen-
sitivity vector is differentially private. However, many other distributions guarantee differential
privacy as well, including the “Laplace” distribution (which is a symmetric exponential distribu-
tion, and gives an even stronger guarantee of (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy compared to Gaussian noise)
(Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith, 2006). Other simple operations such as subsampling k out
of n player actions guarantee (0, k/n)-differential privacy.
Moreover, differential privacy does not degrade with post-processing. The following fact is a
simple consequence of the definition:
Theorem 7 (Post-processing). Let M(D) be an (ǫ, γ)-differentially private family of distributions
over some range O, and let f : O → O′ be any randomized mapping. Then f(M(D)) is an
(ǫ, γ)-differentially private family of distributions over O′.
7It is this property that makes differential privacy a more appealing notion of influence than mere statistical
distance (which corresponds to (0, γ)-differential privacy). If we were to talk only about statistical distance, then the
degradation of the statistical distance parameter would always be linear in the number of compositions, whereas the
degradation in the ǫ parameter in differential privacy can be much slower.
8For large values of k, this simpler statement is substantially weaker than the more sophisticated composition
statement. However, it can be stronger for small values of k.
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What this means is that any signal distribution that can be described as a differentially private
distribution (resulting, from e.g. the composition theorem above), followed by post-processing (for
example, we could have a noisy estimate of the fraction of players playing each action, truncated
and renormalized to form a distribution) remains differentially private.
As a result of the composition theorem and the post-processing theorem, differentially private
signaling distributions are not difficult to come by in natural settings. Most noisy settings can be
seen to satisfy (ǫ, γ)-privacy for some finite values of ǫ and γ. Our theorems apply when these
parameters ǫ and γ tend to zero as n grows large – and as we have seen, this is generally the case
when the noise rate is fixed (independent of n), and the game is large.
5 Conclusions and Open Questions
We have shown that in large games with (public or private) imperfect monitoring, it can naturally
arise that the signaling structure satisfies the constraint of “differential privacy”, in which the
privacy parameters ǫ and γ tend to 0 as the size n of the game grows large. Moreover, we have shown
that whenever this is the case the equilibria of the repeated game collapse to the set of equilibria
of the stage game in large populations. This conclusion holds for a broad class of equilibria of the
repeated game, that e.g. need not necessarily even be subgame perfect. With public monitoring,
the equilibrium set collapses to the set of Nash equilibria of the stage game, and with private
monitoring, the equilibrium set collapses to the set of correlated equilibria of the stage game.
This “anti-folk-theorem” for large, noisy repeated games has several interpretations. On the one
hand, it means that cooperative, high welfare folk-theorem equilibria which cannot be supported
as equilibria of the stage game are also impossible to support in repeated games from this natural
class. On the other hand, it also eliminates low-welfare equilibria of the repeated game that are
not supported in the stage game, and so in general, improves the price of anarchy when computed
over the set of Nash equilibria of the repeated game. Our theorem can also be seen as an argument
that equilibria of the repeated game can be more predictive in large noisy games, than in general
repeated games. By removing the bite of the folk theorem, the multiplicity of possible equilibria
of the repeated game can be greatly reduced, in many cases to a single (or small number of) Nash
equilibria of the stage game.
There remain many interesting questions along this line of inquiry. For example, is there an even
more general condition than differential privacy that can yield the same results? Similarly, there is
the question of whether our theorems are qualitatively tight. Certainly they are in public monitoring
settings – it is always possible to support a sequence of stage game Nash equilibria as an equilibrium
of the repeated game, and we have shown that this is essentially the only class of equilibria that
can be supported in the games that we study. However, in the private monitoring setting, we have
shown only that equilibria of the repeated game must consist of a series of (approximate) correlated
equilibria of the stage game. But is it the case that for every stage game and every sequence of
correlated equilibria of that stage game, there exists a private signaling structure that does indeed
support the sequence of correlated equilibria as an equilibrium of the repeated game?
More broadly, analysis of “large” dynamic and repeated games is easier because each player’s
action is close to myopic/ non-strategic. Several different notions of largeness have been considered
in the literature. For example, Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (2001) use concentration inequalities to
show that only a small number of “pivotal” players will play non-myopically/ strategically in any
large game (see also more recent results by Gradwohl and Reingold (2008)). In an influential paper,
McLean and Postlewaite (2002) define a measure of they term “informational size” which bounds
the amount of information any single player has about a common variable of interest (in an L1
sense), conditional on knowing the information of all other players. Differential privacy has promise
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as an alternate measure of “largeness.” Further the underlying literature studying properties of
differentially private processing (recall, e.g., the results surveyed in Section 4.4) allow for easy use
in applications of interest.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 2. Fix a sequential equilibrium σ = (σ1, . . . , σn). For every player i and
every history hti = h
t
i(a
t
i, s
t), we can define a posterior distribution D(i, hti, σ−i) on histories ht−i
observed by the other players. We note several things: first, since the public signals st are fixed,
D(i, hti, σ−i) defines a distribution only over the actions atj played by each of the other players j 6= i.
Second, since the actions atj played by the other players are a function only of their own past actions
and the public signals st, they are conditionally independent of actions ati fixing the public history
st. Hence, we can write D(i, hti, σ−i) ≡ D(i, st, σ−i). Finally, equivalently note that the distribution
over actions atj , a
t
k of any pair of players j 6= k 6= i are conditionally independent fixing the public
signals st, and so we can decompose D(i, st, σ−i) as a product distribution:
D(i, st, σ−i) =
∏
j 6=i
Dj(i, st, σ−i)
where Dj(i, st, σ−i) represents the marginal distribution on histories htj of player j fixing st.
Fix any set of public signals st, and private histories (ht1, . . . , h
t
n) for the n players consistent
with st. For any player i, define
a∗ = arg max
ai∈Ai
Eht−i∼
∏
j 6=iDj(i,st,σ−i)[ui(ai, σ−i(h
t
−i))]
= arg max
ai∈Ai
Ea−i∼(σˆ1|st ,...,σˆn|st )[ui(ai, a−i)]
Define σ′i to be the strategy that is identical to σi, except on history h
t
i, it plays σ
′
i(h
t
i) = a
∗
i , and
then play in future periods is as if an action drawn from σi(h
t
i) was played in period t.
Formally, for any period τ > t, with realized history hτi , the deviation involves playing σi(h
τ ′
i ),
where hτ
′
i is the same as h
τ
i except in the component corresponding to the action played at time t;
i.e. at
′
i ∼ σi(hit) whereas ati = a∗ by definition. Given the equilibrium strategies σ, we can write:
Vi,σ(h
t
i) =(1− δ)Ea−i∼(σˆ1|st ,...,σˆn|st )[ui(σi(hti), a−i)]
+ δ
∑
s∈S,ai∈Ai
Vi,σ((h
t
i, s, ai))P [s, ai|hti]
Now consider σ′i to be the deviation we described above. Note that by playing σ
′
i from history h
t
i
onwards, player i’s expected discounted payoff can be written as:
Vi,(σ−i,σ′i)(h
t
i) =(1− δ)Ea−i∼(σˆ1|st ,...,σˆn|st )[ui(a∗, a−i)]
+ δ
∑
s∈S,ai∈Ai
Vi,σ((h
t
i, s, ai))P [s|hti, a∗]P [ai|σ(hti)]
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Since σ forms a sequential equilibrium of the repeated game, for every history hti we have:
Vi,σ(h
t
i) ≥ Vi,(σ−i,σ′i)(h
t
i)
Substituting the definitions of Vi,σ(h
t
i) and Vi,(σ−i,σ′i)(h
t
i) into this inequality, we have:(
Ea−i∼(σˆ1|st ,...,σˆn|st )[ui(a
∗, a−i)]− Ea−i∼(σˆ1|st ,...,σˆn|st )[ui(σi(hti), a−i)]
)
≤ δ
1− δ

 ∑
s∈S,ai∈Ai
Vi,σ((h
t
i, s, ai))P [s, ai|hti]−
∑
s∈S,ai∈Ai
Vi,σ((h
t
i, s, ai))P [s|hti, a∗]P [ai|σ(hti)]


By (ǫ, γ)-differential privacy of the private signal, and the fact that exp(−ǫ) ≥ 1 − ǫ, we therefore
have that this is at most
≤ δ
1− δ (ǫ+ γ).
which completes the proof.
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